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Abstract 
Stemming from the McKinnon-Shaw’s advocacy for financial liberalization in “less-developed 
countries” and its attendant unresolved intellectual gymnastics, the authors primarily attempt 
to model the relationship between; financial liberalisation and economic growth on the one 
hand and financial liberalisation and investment on the other. With an array of rich variable 
mix, necessary variable interaction terms, and improvement on some past researches whilst 
inculcating the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) methodology, the study establishes 
the long-run and short-run relationship between financial liberalisation, investment and 
growth in a time series framework.  Secondarily, Granger causality is also employed to 
determine the direction of causality between financial development and economic growth. 
The results obtained suggest that there is a positive long-run equilibrium relationship between 
financial liberalisation; investment and growth. The study also finds a causal relationship 
between financial development and economic growth in Nigeria. This might mean that the 
financial liberalisation process in Nigeria has stimulated financial development leading to 
significant contribution to economic growth. The results might lay credence to the view that 
financial development plays a crucial role in the process of economic development, as such, 
reducing government inefficiencies might be a choice policy in freeing resources for the 
development of financial institutions. 
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“…..Nevertheless, it remains the only game in town as far as successful economic 
development is concerned" (McKinnon 1989, p.53). 
 
Introduction and Motivation 
Whether or not financial repression3, negatively affects investments and ultimately growth in 
any economy remains an economic conundrum. Pioneering and championing the intellectual 
discourse, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), and their disciple  Fry (1989, 1995) submit 
vehemently that financial liberalisation will help an economy by further deepening its financial 
sector, enhancing distributive efficiency and augmenting state policy. In short, they advance 
and postulate that liberalising the financial system is key to achieving rapid economic growth 
cum investment.  Whilst some real world evidential experience for some countries e.g. South 
Korea, Japan and Taiwan support this assertion (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994), somewhat 
greater circumstantial evidence in Turkey, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and numerous 
African countries (Diaz-Alejandro 1985, Moretti 1992, Capoglu 1990, Pill and Pradhan, 1997, 
Khalid 1999, Ariff and Khalid 2000,; Giovannini,1983 & 1985) suggests otherwise, where 
financial liberalization has resulted in plummeting growth rates, crucial financial distress, gross 
macroeconomic instability accompanied with dangerously high interest rates, high inflation 
rates and sharp exchange rate depreciation and almost total collapse of financial 
intermediation.  
It is no news that the Nigerian state has implemented financial liberalization since the early 
1980’s in a bid to strengthen the economy and position it towards accelerated economic 
                                                          
3
 Financial repression, a term ascribed to and supposedly coined by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), denotes a 
multiplicity of government regulations, laws, and other non-market restrictions which tend (combine) to impair the 
optimum functionings of the financial intermediaries and paraphernalia of an economy. 
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growth, however, her experience could be dubbed a mixed grill judging by the conclusions of 
various studies; (Ikhide and Alawode, 2002; Akpan, 2004; Orok-Duke et al, 2009; Nzotta and 
Okereke, 2009; Okpara, 2010). Building and improving on these earlier studies some of which 
suffer methodological deficiency (limited data and omitted variable bias)., inadequate rigor 
(descriptive statistical analysis), misleading results and inferences, the authors examine 
Nigeria’s experience with financial liberalisation using updated data and including more 
variables in a time series analysis. Specifically, by employing sufficient econometric analysis, 
the authors try to establish the relationship between financial liberalisation and economic 
growth as well as between financial liberalization and investment. 
The study will present a theoretical framework, a literature review, spell out the methods to 
be used in confirming the scientific guesses, represent the result of the empirics or estimations 
and conclude with some comments.  
Objective of the study 
The study seeks to confirm the following conjectural statements; 
A.) Financial liberalisation enhanced economic growth in Nigeria. 
B.) Financial liberalisation increased domestic investment in Nigeria. 
 
Financial Liberalization: Theory, Literature, Experience and Evidence   
Financial liberalisation in some quarters is widely thought about as a crucial and inevitable 
means of accelerating economic development. Rigorously and broadly, it refers to a set of 
policy prescriptions and reforms designed at deregulating the domestic financial market and 
opening of the capital account of a country with the view of moving towards a more market-
oriented system (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994; Johnston and Sundararajan, 1999). . According 
to Williamson and Mahar (1998), financial repression the antithesis of financial liberalization 
is manifested in so called less developed countries in the following dimensions; a.) the 
4 
 
government, not market, determine(d/s) who receive(d/s) credit. b.) The government, not 
market, determine(d/s) interest rates. c) The government determine(d/s) whether new 
institution would be allowed to enter the financial sector. d) The government laid down details 
of banks’ operations such as who they hired and what salaries were paid. e) The government 
owned financial institutions. f) The government decide(s/d) who would be allowed to borrow 
and lend abroad, and on what terms.  
Protagonist views and researches on financial liberalization are discussed below under 
following headings. 
The McKinnon-Shaw Hypothesis 
 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) observed the key features of financial systems in LDCs. 
They noted that the financial systems of LDCs have little institutional diversity i.e. centred on 
commercial banks and that these banks have miniscule stock of alternative financial 
instruments. They opine that there exist a strong relationship between the financial system 
and the governments, with banks often financing government expenditures deducing that, “in 
fact”, the financial system is (over)regulated by the government and this restricts the ability of 
the banks to lend to potential high returns investment. 
Further, they say observe that in many LDCs, government impose extensive restrictions on 
the operations of banks and that these restrictions can take a number of forms such as interest 
rate ceilings which are low (and in real terms, sometimes negative), liquidity requirements 
which effectively force the banks to fund government activities on favourable terms, reserve 
requirements which force banks to hold reserves at the central bank at low or even zero rates, 
and active intervention favouring particular sectors or firms inter alia. As such, these 
restrictions reduces the profitability of banking activities and can be thought of as a ‘’tax’’ on 
banks. The ‘’tax’’ can be effectively a major source of government revenues replacing other 
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forms of revenue. Collectively, it is these restrictions imposed by the government they call 
financial repression. 
According to McKinnon and Shaw, financial repression explains the key features of LDCs 
financial structure; flow of funds through the organised sector (banks) is reduced and informal 
curb markets, which are not subject to control, grow at the expense of the formal system. 
Therefore, financial repression is viewed as a central part of the failure of LDCs to grow more 
vigorously; both saving and investment are reduced and the investment that does take place 
is not the highest return (see Sen and Vaidya, 1997). Similarly, Stiglitz and Weiss (1989) 
indicate that financial repression reduces the screening and monitoring functions of financial 
institutions. Moreover, agents are forced into activities, for example, holding more extensive 
stocks of money than they need for lack of access or confidence in the banks. Figure 1 
presents the argument of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) in more details. 
Illustration 1: The McKinnon-Shaw Framework 
        
 
Sgi represents the flow of savings associated with different growth rates gi (that is, conditioned 
on a particular growth rate), I is the investment demand schedule, interest rate rp represents 
the interest rate (in real terms) ceiling. At rp, the saving rate is Sp and although desired 
investments are Ip* actual investments are limited to Ip. The investments which do take place 
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are rationed according to some, usually non-economic, rule (for example, political) or a 
preference for riskier investments.  
Now consider if the interest rate ceiling is removed; r rises to r* and, nevertheless, investment 
rises to Ip* and savings rises to Ip* (where S=I). Therefore, despite higher real interest rates 
both savings and investment rise promoting economic growth through a rise in the allocative 
efficiency of investment. Furthermore, higher levels of economic growth shifts the savings 
function to Sgii and, thus, the long-term rate of interest is lowered, raising investment and 
savings further. 
The clear policy implications of the foregoing includes the removal of interest rate ceilings 
and the removal of other ‘’taxes’’ on banks by removing onerous regulations which hinder the 
financial market from operating competitively. In addition to increased savings (as emphasised 
by McKinnon), investment and growth, the removal of interest rate ceilings will deepen 
integration of the financial and other sectors (as emphasised by Shaw), raise the efficiency of 
investment and government policy will be improved. 
Financial Liberalisation, Savings, Investment, Allocative Efficiency and Economic 
Growth  
As hitherto highlighted, the key measure of financial liberalisation is the removal of 
restrictions on interest rate. This will in turn increase savings as savings is assumed to be 
responsive to interest rates and the higher savings rates will finance a higher level of 
investment (Shrestha, 2005). This view is supported by Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2001) when 
they opine that financial liberalisation should be expected to lead to higher saving rate as well 
as higher levels of and more profitable investment. Higher real interest rates tend to attract 
more savings from households to bank deposits and this makes more loanable funds available 
for investment. The interest rate represents the price of borrowed money or the opportunity 
cost of lending money for a given period of time. During this period, the real value of financial 
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assets can be reduced by inflation and lenders want to be compensated for an expected 
reduction in the purchasing power of these assets. The real interest rate is thus the rate 
adjusted with a due compensation for the anticipated inflation (see Bascom 1994, pp. 10; 
Shrestha 2005, pp. 29). 
Several channels through which financial liberalisation can lead to economic growth have 
been highlighted in the literature. For example, the cost of capital is substantially reduced as 
foreign investors, maximising the gains of diversification that comes with financial 
liberalisation, drive up domestic equity prices. This is supported by the argument of Bekaert 
and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000) who indicate that the cost of capital reduces after major 
regulatory reforms. A reduction in the cost of capital increases investment, and if the increased 
investment is efficient, it will foster economic growth. Similarly, Galindo et al (2002) find that 
financial liberalisation reduces the cost of capital which in turn enhances the growth rates of 
economic sectors that for technological reasons depend heavily on foreign finance. However, 
they conclude that this result is subject to the quality of institutions supporting credit markets. 
In a similar argument, Lucas (1990) posit that integration enables capital flows from rich 
economies to poor economies since the latter has relatively lower capital-labour ratios which 
should generate higher returns to capital. This increased capital inflow contributes positively 
to equity prices. In addition, increased access to foreign capital as a result of capital flows 
should complement limited domestic saving in poor countries and addresses the constraint 
on investment. This will in turn enhance growth in poor countries and also allow residents of 
richer countries to get higher returns on their savings invested abroad (Prasad and Rajan, 
2008). In this way, an excess of saving over investment in one country finds an outlet in 
another, leading to efficient allocation of scarce capital (see Obstfeld 1994; Acemoglu and 
Ziliboti 1997; Klein and Olivei 1999; Levine 2001; Bonfiglioli 2008). However, following the 
spate of recent financial crises, some researchers argue that the gains of financial liberalisation 
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have been undermined because capital inflows have been wasted on inappropriate 
consumption and unproductive investment. 
According to Kose et al (2006) liberalisation and integration of the financial system act as a 
catalyst for certain collateral benefits which could lead to an increase in GDP growth and 
reduction in consumption volatility. For example, financial liberalisation could generate 
technology spillover and foster corporate governance and other forms of organisational 
expertise from advanced economies to poor economies thereby enhancing economic growth. 
Similarly, financial liberalisation could impose discipline on macroeconomic policies since it 
increases the potential costs that come with weak policies and improve the gains of good ones. 
However, while the empirical evidence supports this view, it remains sparse. In contrast, 
financial liberalisation may impede economic growth in the presence of distortions. It may 
precipitate financial crisis and misallocation of capital, which are harmful for macroeconomic 
performance (Bonfiglioli, 2008; Eichengreen, 2001). 
Furthermore, the evidence on the relationship between financial liberalisation and economic 
growth is mixed. For example, Bekaert and Harvey (2000) using regression of average annual 
per capita GDP growth on a number of variables observe that the financial liberalisation 
indicator displays a consistently positive and statistically significant coefficient. In fact, they 
show that financial liberalisation leads to an increase in per capita GDP growth of anywhere 
from 1.5% to as large as 2.3% per year. Similarly, Fowowe (2008) finds significant positive 
relationship between financial liberalisation and economic growth. Using a panel data of 19 
Sub-Saharan African countries with two indexes to measure financial liberalisation, he 
concludes that the relationship is positive. This is consistent with the findings of Hermes and 
Lensink (2005) that use a dataset for measuring financial liberalisation for a sample of 25 
developing countries over the period 1973-1996. Their result suggests a positive relationship 
between financial liberalisation and economic growth measured by per capita GDP growth. 
Also, Quinn (1997) uses data over the period 1960-1989 for 66 countries and finds a 
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statistically significant positive relationship between his financial liberalisation indicator and 
growth. 
In contrast, a number of other studies have found little or no evidence supporting the link 
between financial liberalisation and economic growth. For example, Rodrik (1998) uses data 
for about 100 countries for 1975-1989 to analyse the relationship between financial 
liberalisation and economic growth. He regresses the growth rate of GDP per capital on a 
binary indicator of financial openness constructed by the IMF, controlling for determinants 
drawn largely from the empirical literature on economic growth. His result suggests no 
association between financial openness and growth and questions whether capital flows spur 
economic growth. In addition, mixed findings on the relationship between financial 
liberalisation and economic growth have been reported by other studies such as Kraay (1998), 
Klein and Olivei (1999), Reisen and Soto (2001) and, Khalid (2004).  
It should be noted, however, that even studies that do find a positive relationship between 
financial liberalisation and economic growth suffer from potential endogeineity, which 
ultimately may be difficult to control for if one relies on macroeconomic data. Using 
disaggregated data may be a plausible solution; however, for most countries this type of data 
is often largely unavailable. 
Talking about allocative efficiency, Bekaert et al (2001) clarifies that financial liberalisation can 
enhance allocative efficiency through the development or deepening of the financial system 
and improved market efficiency. This view was corroborated by Wurgler (2000) who provides 
an empirical link between financial development and efficiency of credit allocation. Financial 
liberalisation can also generate international competition which would improve the 
functioning of domestic financial systems, thereby increasing savings and allocation (Klein 
and Olivei, 1999; Levine, 2001). Similar several  researches and studies such as (Shrestha 2005, 
Kukenova 2011) McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973). Galindo et al (2007) Laeven (2002)  support 
this proposition Nevertheess, it is worthy of note that some researches most notably Stiglitz 
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and Weiss (1981) warn that liberalisation does not end inefficiencies of credit rationing due 
to asymmetries in information which reduces allocative efficiency in free credit markets. 
Somewhat retracting on his hitherto unguarded generalization and “labelization” of the 
benefits of financial liberalization, upon realization of the failure of financial liberalization 
experience of some countries, McKinnon (1991) argues that sequencing is key in any financial 
liberalization process, that it is not just enough to simply dislodge interest rate ceiling, it has 
to be done sequentially. In other words there are somewhat important preconditions. This 
approach indicates that there are macroeconomic prerequisites to liberalisation (McKinon 
1982; 1991). He vehemently contends that the order and sequencing of the liberalisation 
process is very crucial in reaping the potential benefits of financial liberalisation while avoiding 
its downside. Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994) Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) echo such views. 
They maintain that there is indeed an optimal path for liberalising the domestic real sector, 
the domestic financial sector, the external real sector and the external financial sector and that 
following the wrong path would encourage reckless lending by domestic financial institutions 
as their ability to borrow abroad is increased, consequentially, any slowdown in the economy 
will trigger capital flight, exposing domestic banks to insolvency, particularly, domestic banks 
will be unable to compete efficiently with foreign banks because they are still highly repressed 
which works to increase the cost of intermediation. Corroboratingly, if a developing country 
decides to open the financial system before liberalising the domestic real sector, then there is 
the tendency for credit to flow to industries which are only considered profitable because 
relative prices are distorted. (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994). 
Nevertheless, the correct order of liberalising the domestic financial sector and the external 
real sector is, however, not entirely clear. This is because liberalising the domestic financial 
sector before trade can cause credit to again flow to tradeables sector which is only profitable 
because of barriers to trade. Similarly, if trade is liberalised before the domestic financial 
sector, then this could impede the competitiveness of domestic industries in world markets. 
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Notwithstanding to McKinnon, financial liberalization… remains the only game in town. 
Methods(s) 
The empirical link between financial liberalisation and economic growth as well as investment 
is estimated using the Ordinary Least Square-based Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) 
model (approach to cointegration) which circumvents most of the econometric problems 
such as endogeneity that often beset many empirical studies (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997).  
Granger Causality test will be used to complement the ARDL estimation approach. The time 
series analysis covers the annual period of 1970-2009 and is largely based on secondary data. 
The data used in this study are obtained from different sources, including various publications 
of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) statistical bulletins and annual reports, National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS), World Bank World Development Indicator (WDI) database, IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database and Africa Development Indicators database. 
The data for civil liberty is from the Freedom House while data for the financial liberalisation 
index used in this study is from the Chinn-Ito index. A summary statistics of the data set is 
presented in table A3 in appendix A. Unit root tests are also conducted for all the variables 
used in this study. 
  
Measuring Financial Liberalisation 
The literature is awash with different indexes constructed to capture the extent of financial 
openness (liberalization) in an economic over time, as such, a multiplicity of measures have 
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been employed in studies investigating the effect of financial liberalisation. However, such 
measures have been found not to completely capture the complexity of real world capital 
controls (see Edison and Warnock, 2001; Edwards, 2001; Chin and Ito, 2006). In this study 
Chin-Ito index otherwise called the KAOPEN4, constructed by Chinn and Ito (2002, 2006, 
and 2007) is adopted. 
KAOPEN is a de jure measure of financial liberalisation that is based on the binary dummy 
variables that arrange into a systematic code the restrictions on cross border financial 
transactions reported in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). It is the first principal 
component of four types of restrictions on cross border capital transactions reported in 
AREAER which includes: the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current 
account and capital account transactions, as well as requirements on surrender of export 
proceeds (see Chinn and Ito, 2007, pp. 5). 
KAOPEN has been found to overcome the limitation noted above and it is robust in that it 
measures the intensity and extensity of capital controls. Another advantage of this index is 
that it has a wide coverage of over 180 countries and a long time period from 1970 to 2009.  
Econometric Growth Model 
In analysing the relationship between financial liberalisation and economic growth, the 
following baseline model is estimated: 
GRGDPt = λ0 + λ1FINLIBt + λ2FDEPTHt + λ3 RINTERESTt +  λ4INVESTt + λ5INFLATIONt +  λ6GOVEXPENt +  εt                                             (1)                
Where, GRGDP = annual growth rate of real GDP 
                                                          
4
 KAOPEN is also referred to as the Chinn-Ito Index. 
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FINLIB = financial liberalisation index (KAOPEN) FDEPTH = financial depth proxied by credit to the private sector RINTEREST = real rate of interest INVEST = investment measured as ratio of investment to GDP INFLATION = inflation rate based on consumer price index GOVEXPEN = government expenditure as a ratio of GDP 
εt is the white noise with mean 0 and variance σ2 and it is normally distributed and λ0 to λ6 
are the coefficients of the respective variables.  
The dependent variable; the growth rate of GDP measures economic growth and it is 
determined by the right hand variables which are largely drawn from the literature on financial 
liberalisation and economic growth. As mentioned above, the financial liberalisation index 
used throughout this study is the index, KAOPEN constructed by Chinn and Ito. This index 
has an ambiguous a priori sign owing to the unsettled debates on financial liberalisation and 
economic growth in the economic literature some of which have been highlighted in this 
study. Similarly, the sign of the coefficient of the financial depth measure is ambiguous a 
priori. 
The real interest rate is included to capture the effect of interest rate liberalisation on 
economic growth. It is expected that the coefficient of the real interest rate would be positive. 
A positive relationship between real interest rate and economic growth will support the 
hypothesis on interest rate liberalisation postulated by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). 
The rationale for the inclusion of inflation is to capture the effect of macroeconomic stability 
as well as the effect on various components of money. Inflation affects the holding of financial 
assets by agents and tends to encourage the holding of currency and discourage the holding 
of quasi-money (Ikhide, 1992; Odhiambo, 2005). English (1999) argues that when the rate of 
inflation is high, households tend to substitute purchased transaction for money balances 
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thereby enhancing savings and providing funds for investment and economic growth. In this 
case the relationship between inflation and economic growth is positive. A summary of the 
theories on the relationship between inflation and growth by Vikesh and Subrina (2004) also 
indicates that the relation can be positive. They argue that if a firm, for example, has entered 
a contract to supply goods at a future date at an agreed price, then output will not decline 
even if overall prices of goods in the economy have risen. The producer is under obligation 
to honour the contract made with the consumer. By contrast, uncertainty about the 
profitability of investment projects in the future could arise as a result of high inflation in the 
economy and this could have a negative impact on economic growth. This is especially the 
case if high inflation comes with increased price variability (Misati and Nyamongo, 2011). 
Thus, there is uncertainty surrounding the prediction of the inflation rate a priori. 
Furthermore, economic theory suggests that the relationship between factor accumulation 
(investment) and economic growth is expected to be positive. For government expenditure 
as a ratio of GDP, the relationship with economic growth is ambiguous a priori; the direction 
of the relationship largely depends on whether government expenditure crowds in or crowds 
out investment. On the one hand, government expenditure can erode the efficient allocation 
of resources or crowd out resources that are available for more efficient and profitable sectors 
of the economy, consequently resulting in a negative impact on growth. However, if the 
government decides to focus its expenditure on nonrivalrous and nonexcludable public 
services, investment will be enhanced thereby fostering economic growth.  
Additionally Additively, two interaction terms; FL*CIVLIB and FL*INFLATION are 
created. (CIVLIB) Civil liberty stands as an institutional variable while (INFLATION) 
inflation rate stands as macroeconomic stability variable. The interactions were created owing 
to the fact that recent discourse on financial liberalization has seen economists and researchers 
alike pinpoint macroeconomic instability as an undermining factor and a crises vulnerability 
multiplier as far as financial liberalisation impact is concerned. They also point fingers at the 
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institutional framework of/in a country as a crucial factor if the benefits of financial reforms 
to be reaped. Still on the created interaction terms, the study makes use of only one dimension 
of institution whereas some other studies used the index constructed by the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG)5 which is more encompassing. In the same vein, only one aspect 
of policy variable is adopted in capturing macroeconomic instability unlike Asante (2000) who 
create an index for macroeconomic instability using the first principal component of inflation 
rate, external debt as a percentage of GDP, moving coefficient of variation of real exchange 
rate and black market premium. The use of only one variable to capture either of institution 
or macroeconomic environment is largely due to non-availability of data and as such a caveat 
that results would have to be interpreted with caution. A significant financial liberalisation 
variable combined with a negative and statistically significant FL*INFLATION term would 
indicate that financial liberalisation only fosters economic growth in an economy with sound 
macroeconomic environment while a positive and significant FL*CIVLIB term will provide 
support that financial liberalisation is effective only in an environment with quality institution.  
Econometric Investment Model 
Economic theory advice that financial liberalisation enhances efficient allocation of resources 
and provides the platform for harnessing savings to achieve high returns investment. A more 
liberalised financial system is thus viewed to stimulate capital accumulation that will accelerate 
economic growth. To examine the relationship between financial liberalisation and 
investment, we analyse the following relationship: 
 
INVESTt = γ0 + γ1FINLIBt + γ2FDEPTHt + γ3LENDINGRATEt + γ4GOVEXPENt +                            γ5TDCBt + γ6EXTDEBTt + ϵt                                                                  
(2)             
Where, 
                                                          
5
 The ICRG starts from 1984 whereas this study covers the period from 1970 to 2009. 
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INVEST = Domestic Investment measured as ratio of investment to GDP LENDINGRATE = real lending rate TDCB = total deposit of commercial banks EXTDEBT = ratio of debt service to export of goods and services ϵt is the white noise and γ0 to γ6 are the coefficients of the respective variables. Other 
variables are as defined above. 
In the above equation, the coefficient of the financial liberalisation index is ambiguous a priori 
following the arguments presented earlier in this study. This is also the case for the financial 
depth indicator. The real lending rate is expected to be negatively linked to investment. This 
is because investors tend to invest less when interest rates increase, because the cost of 
borrowing funds increases. Moreover, firms often have to devote a substantial portion of their 
resources to paying interest on existing debt, thereby eroding the amount of funds available 
for meaningful investment. 
For reasons mentioned earlier, the effect of government expenditure is ambiguous. An 
increase in the total deposit of commercial bank is expected to increase investment as more 
funds are made available to investors. External debt is expected to be harmful to investment 
and should therefore have a negative coefficient. This is because debt obligations can suck up 
a substantial amount of important resources that could be harnessed to drive investment; 
increased debt service moves resources away from economically productive uses.  
Stationarity Test 
One of the most popular tests for stationarity (unit root test) is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test, a parametric approach originally proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981). 
However, it has been shown, through Monte Carlo simulations, that the ADF test has very 
low power. According to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), although the ADF has good power 
characteristics as compared to other unit root tests in the literature, it is nevertheless not very 
powerful in finite samples (pp. 213). In fact, if the order of augmentation of the ADF test is 
large relative to the sample size, the test has been found to have almost no power. 
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Furthermore, the ADF test, though is able to accommodate error autocorrelation (Peseran & 
Pesaran, 1997), does not discriminate clearly between stationary and non-stationary series with 
a higher degree of autocorrelation (West, 1988) and is sensitive to structural breaks. Hence, 
this study supplements the ADF test with the semi-parametric approach of Phillips and 
Perron (1988). The Phillips-Perron (PP) test of stationarity has been found to give robust 
estimates in the presence of serial correlation and time dependent heteroskedasticity. 
The results of the ADF test with intercept as well as with intercept and trend are presented in 
table 1 below while the PP test is captured in table A2 in appendix A. The results of the unit 
root tests using the ADF test statistics indicates that 8 out of the 12 variables are integrated 
of order one I(1), which implies they are non-stationary. Four of the variables, namely 
INFLATION, RINTEREST, CIVLIB and TDCB are integrated of order zero I(0), meaning 
they are stationary. The PP tests also suggest that 9 variables are I(1) while 3 variables are I(0). 
Moreover, while CIVLIB is I(0) under the ADF test it is shown to be I(1) under the PP test. 
However, the estimation method employed in this study is valid irrespective of whether the 
regressors are I(0) or I(1). Therefore, we can conclude that our variables satisfy a basic 
requirement for the analysis used in this study. 
 
TABLE 1: Results of Unit Root Test of Variables - ADF Test 
 
 
 
Series 
ADF test- Intercept  
 
 
Conclusion 
ADF test-Intercept & 
Trend 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Level 
1st 
Difference 
 
Level 
1st 
Difference 
GRGDP -2.086 -4.784*** I(1) -2.334 -4.615*** I(1) 
FINLIB -1.478 -5.388*** I(1) -1.786 -5.353*** I(1) 
INVEST -1.538 -6.164*** I(1) -2.619 -4.456*** I(1) 
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INFLATION -3.612*** - I(0) -3.561** - I(0) 
RINTEREST -3.430** - I(0) -3.521* - I(0) 
LENDINGR
ATE 
-1.560 -6.805*** I(1) -1.899 -6.763*** I(1) 
GOVEXPEN -2.201 -7.551*** I(1) -2.350 -7.446*** I(1) 
EXTDEBT -1.108 -5.818*** I(1) -0.629 -6.164*** I(1) 
CIVLIB -3.261** - I(0) -3.286* - I(0) 
OPEN -1.885 -7.244*** I(1) -2.004 -7.293*** I(1) 
FDEPTH 0.363 -4.259*** I(1) -0.148 -4.399*** I(1) 
TDCB -3.951*** - I(0) -3.914*** - I(0) 
Note: **, * indicate 1% and 5% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
The ARDL Approach   
The ARDL approach was developed by Pesaran and Shin (1995), Pesaran et al (1996), Pesaran 
and Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran et al (2001). A number of recent studies have used the ARDL 
approach as a better approach to cointegration than such methods as Engle and Granger 
(1987), Johansen (1991, 1995), Phillips and Hansen (1990) and Johansen-Juselius (1990). The 
ARDL approach has been recognised to have a number of distinctive merits.  
First, the ARDL approach is valid irrespective of whether the underlying variables are purely 
I(0), purely I(1) or fractionally integrated. Second, the long run and short run components of 
the model can be estimated simultaneously using the ARDL approach. As noted by Banerjee 
et al (1993) the ARDL approach can be used to obtain a dynamic error correction model 
(ECM) through a simple linear transformation of the model. The ECM combines the short 
run dynamics with the long run equilibrium without losing long run information (Shrestha, 
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2005). Moreover, it allows for the inclusion of deterministic or exogenous regressors in the 
model (Marashdeh, 2005). Third, unlike most cointegration approach, the ARDL approach is 
robust in small samples (such as this study). Fourth, it is robust against econometric issues 
such as weak exogeneity, simultaneous equation bias, serial correlation and endogeneity as it 
has been found that its long run estimates and test statistics remain valid even in the presence 
of these issues (see Pesaran and Shin, 1995; Gounder, 2001). Fifth, unlike most conventional 
methods which are sensitive to the non-normality of the data, the ARDL approach is valid 
for analysing non-normal data. Sixth, to capture the data generating process in a general-to-
specific modelling framework the ARDL approach uses sufficient number of lags (Shrestha, 
2005). 
The ECM is a representation of a cointegrated system that makes explicit the idea of moving 
together over time. To illustrate, consider the model: 
                     Yt = β + ωXt + ψZt + Wt                                                                               
(3)             
Where Yt, Xt and Zt represent different time series and Wt is white noise; β, ω and ψ are the 
parameters. The ECM involves estimation of the following version of equation (3): 
                      ΔYt = β0 + ∑ ωipi=1 ΔYt−i + ∑ ψipi=1 ΔXt−i + ∑ ξipi=1 ΔZt−i + δ1Yt−1 +                                            δ2Xt−1 + δ3Zt−1 + υt                                                                (4)                                                                                           
                       
In the above equation ω, ψ and ξ are the short run coefficients of the ARDL model while the 
δ’s capture the long run relationships. The maximum lag to be used is represented by p. The 
ARDL model estimates (p + 1)k number of regressions to obtain optimal lag length for each 
variable, where k is the number of variables in the equation. Because annual data are used in 
this study, we select 2 as the maximum order of the lags to be used6.  
                                                          
6
 For quarterly data, 4 is selected as the maximum lag (see Peseran and Pesaran, 1997). 
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The ARDL approach involves two stages for estimating the long run relationship between 
the variables. The first stage involves testing the null hypothesis of non-existence of the long 
run relationship given by: 
H0: δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = 0 
This hypothesis is tested against the alternative of the existence of a cointegration relationship, 
that is, the δ’s are jointly different from zero. This is achieved by computing the F-statistic. 
However, this F-statistic has a non-standard distribution irrespective of whether the variables 
are stationary or non-stationary. The computed F-statistic is compared to two sets of critical 
value band tabulated by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997). The upper bound assumes that all the 
variables are I(1) while the lower bound assumes all the variables are I(0). The null hypothesis 
is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis if the computed F-statistic is greater than 
the upper bound, thus, establishing that the variables are cointegrated. In contrast, if the F-
statistic is less than the lower bound we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. 
The result is inconclusive if the F-statistic falls within the two critical values (ibid, pp. 304). 
In the second stage of the ARDL estimation procedure, the long run coefficients are estimated 
with the associated short run ECM. The lag selection criteria of the model can be based on 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) or Schwartz-Bayesian Criterion (SBC). However, in this 
study we select the model based on SBC as this statistic has been found to have a 
parsimonious specification that selects the smallest possible lag length ( Pesaran and Smith, 
1998).  
Furthermore, to establish the reliability and appropriateness of our model we conduct 
diagnostic tests and stability tests. Serial correlation, functional form, normality and 
heteroscedasticity tests are examined using the diagnostic tests7. The stability test utilizes the 
                                                          
7
 The diagnostic tests is based on the Lagrange Multiplier test of residual serial correlation, Ramsey’s Reset test using 
the square of the fitted values for functional form, test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals for normality test, and 
regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values for heteroskedaticity test. 
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cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares of 
recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ) proposed by Brown et al (1975). The estimation is conducted 
using Microfit 4.0. 
 
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
The first step in the ARDL estimation approach is to test the joint significance of the lagged 
level using the F-statistic which implies the existence of a long run relationship among the 
variables. The results of the F-statistic with the associated ARDL model selected based on 
SBC for the five regressions are reported in table 2. 
TABLE 2 : F-test for the Existence of a Long Run Relationship among Variables 
Regression Number of 
regressors 
ARDL Model Selected The calculated F-statistics 
1 6 (2,2,0,1,1,0,1) 5.707*** 
2 7 (2,2,0,1,1,0,1,0) 5.160*** 
3 8 (2,2,0,0,1,0,1,0,2) 4.179** 
4 9 (2,2,0,0,2,2,2,2,2,1) 3.524** 
5 8 (2,2,0,0,2,0,1,0,1) 3.872** 
6 9 (2,0,0,0,2,0,1,0,1,2) 3.261* 
7 6 (1,0,0,1,0,0,0) 3.673** 
8 7 (1,1,0,1,2,0,2,2) 6.271*** 
9 8 (1,1,2,2,1,0,2,2,2) 6.017*** 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The relevant 
critical value bounds are obtained from Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, pp. 478). The numbers in 
parenthesis separated by commas are the lags for the variables in the equation listed in the 
same order. 
The results show that we reject the null of no cointegration amongst the variables at the 1% 
significance level for regressions 1, 2, 8 & 9, at the 5% level for regressions 3-5 and 7, and at 
the 10% level for regression 6. Thus, we conclude that there is a long run relation between 
the variables used in all the regressions. 
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Financial Liberalisation and Economic Growth 
Here, we estimate the long-run relation between financial liberalisation policy and economic 
growth. As indicated earlier, the baseline economic growth model used in this study is given 
below. Our variable of interest is FINLIB and five other control variables are selected based 
on the existing literature. The results of the long run coefficient estimates based on the 
equation below and its modifications are presented in table 3. 
GRGDPt = λ0 + λ1FINLIBt + λ2FDEPTHt + λ3 RINTERESTt +  λ4INVESTt + λ5INFLATIONt +  λ6GOVEXPENt +  εt                             
  
Regression (1) indicates that the financial liberalisation index is positive and has a statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) effect on real GDP growth. This implies that there is a significant 
long run effect of financial liberalisation on economic growth. In particular, a unit change in 
the financial liberalisation index leads to about 5.9% increase in real GDP growth, after 
controlling for the other variables. Similarly, the financial depth measure carries a positive 
sign, which shows that a more developed financial system leads to higher economic growth 
in Nigeria. However, it has an insignificant coefficient. 
TABLE 3 : Estimated Long Run Coefficients of the Growth Model  
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP 
REGRESSOR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INTERCEPT 30.321 
(8.062) 
32.323 
(8.120) 
42.689 
(5.896) 
60.139         
(4.509) 
20.747     
(4.369) 
27.667    
(2.642) 
FINLIB 5.965*** 
(4.664) 
6.088*** 
(4.897) 
19.192*** 
(3.049) 
34.899*** 
(3.305) 
7.177*** 
(5.092) 
10.882    
(1.587) 
FDEPTH 0.129 
(1.677) 
0.145* 
(1.917) 
0.136* 
(1.869) 
0.146**      
(2.632) 
0.171**   
(2.170) 
0.189**  
(2.307) 
RINTEREST -0.249***  
(-3.670) 
-0.234***  
(-3.538) 
-0.098         
(-1.442) 
0.015          
(0.271) 
-0.160**         
(-2.771) 
-0.111         
(-1.600) 
INVEST 0.417*** 
(3.680) 
0.409*** 
(3.734) 
0.496*** 
(4.343) 
0.587**      
(2.538) 
0.780***   
(3.165) 
0.846***           
(3.452) 
INFLATION -4.941***  
(-4.087) 
-4.281***  
(-3.367) 
-5.174*** 
(-2.940) 
-8.593**    
(-2.235) 
-5.330***  
(-4.263) 
-4.642***     
(-3.067) 
GOVEXPEN -2.075***  
(-6.436) 
-2.262***  
(-6.515) 
-2.562***  
(-6.937) 
-2.869***  
(-5.487) 
-2.534***  
(-4.969) 
-2.827***   
(-5.258) 
OPEN  -0.037         
(-1.288) 
-0.101**    
(-2.602) 
-0.191***  
(-4.680) 
-0.004         
(-0.155) 
-0.022         
(-0.572) 
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CIVLIB     2.628**         
(2.735) 
1.212         
(0.560) 
FL*INFLATN.   -4.16**      
(-2.158) 
-9.309**    
(-2.832) 
  
EXTDEBT    0.118E-3    
(0.008) 
  
FL*CIVLIB      -0.845         
(-0.578) 
No. of Obs. 
Adjusted-R2 
F-statistic 
Serial Correl. 
Funct. Form 
Normality 
Heteroscedas. 
DW-statistic 
38 
0.58 
4.935*** 
F=0.037 
F=3.838* 
LM=0.600 
F=0.045 
1.913 
38 
0.59 
4.817*** 
F=0.345 
F=1.798 
LM=0.548 
F=0.402 
1.811 
38 
0.62 
4.824*** 
F=0.262 
F=3.069* 
LM=0.554 
F=0.066 
1.770 
38 
0.76 
5.813*** 
F=0.588 
F=0.736 
LM=0.070 
F=0.255 
2.302 
38 
0.65 
5.304*** 
F=0.196 
F=4.264* 
LM=1.255 
F=0.003 
2.071 
38 
0.65 
5.061*** 
F=0.395 
F=0.879 
LM=1.210 
F=0.002 
2.132 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The coefficient of the real interest rate carries a negative sign and is significant. This suggests 
that, as the cost of borrowing increases, the incentive of firms to invest reduces, hampering 
economic growth. However, this result contradicts the Mckinnon-Shaw argument. 
Investment has the expected positive sign and is significantly related to Nigeria’s economic 
growth. The coefficient of inflation is negative and significant and implies that bad 
macroeconomic environment is detrimental to economic growth in Nigeria. Similarly, 
government expenditure exerts a negative and significant impact on economic growth. This 
is consistent with the neoclassical argument that increased government size tend to crowd out 
private investment, thereby impeding growth.  
It is worth noting that regression (1) has a relatively high adjusted-R2 of 0.58 indicating that 
our model accounts for about 58% of the variation in Nigeria’s economic growth. Also, the 
regression passes all the diagnostic tests except functional form test which it fails marginally 
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at the 10%. Moreover, the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots presented in appendix B indicate 
that our model is not misspecified and there is no structural instability. Furthermore, the F-
statistic of the joint significance of the regressors is significant at the 1% level. 
The estimated ECM of the selected ARDL model is presented in table 4. The ECM shows 
the speed of adjustment to remove disequilibrium in the model following a disturbance. The 
ECM is negative as expected and significant at the 1% level, establishing the existence of a 
short run relationship. However, the result of the ECM model suggests that there is an 
overshooting of GDP growth (the coefficient of the ECM term should be negative and 
significant with a value between 0 and -1) in the year following a shock. The ECM also shows 
that a change in financial liberalisation index (ΔFINLIB) has a statistically significant and 
positive effect on the change in the growth rate of GDP (ΔGDP GROWTH). This implies 
that a change in the financial liberalisation index is associated with a change in the growth rate 
of GDP in the short-run. However, the change in the lag of FINLIB, i.e., ΔFINLIB1 has a 
negative impact on the growth rate of GDP. 
Following the arguments in the extant literature on trade and growth, we introduce the trade 
variable OPEN in regression (2). Our results suggest that the financial liberalisation index is 
positive and statistically significant both in the long-run and short-run. However, the 
coefficient on OPEN is negative, indicating that trade openness exerts a negative impact on 
economic growth. A plausible explanation for this is when the export of a country does not 
generate sufficient income to support its import. However, the coefficient of OPEN is 
insignificant. It should be noted that regression (2) satisfies all the econometric tests and has 
a relatively high adjusted-R2. 
Previously, we highlighted that macroeconomic instability has been advanced as one of the 
reasons why the benefit of financial liberalisation has been undermined. Thus, in regression 
(3), we introduce an interaction term between the financial liberalisation index and the 
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macroeconomic instability variable to test the hypothesis that macroeconomic stability is a 
prerequisite for financial liberalisation to enhance growth. As mentioned earlier, we use the 
rate of inflation to capture the state of the macroeconomic environment. The result shows 
that the financial liberalisation index is positive and significant while the interaction term is 
negative and significant. This indicates that the effect of financial liberalisation on growth is 
decreasing with the level of macroeconomic instability and is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the effectiveness of financial liberalisation is conditioned upon macroeconomic stability. 
The financial depth measure and investment are positive and significant. The coefficients of 
the real interest rate, inflation and government expenditure are negative and significant while 
trade openness is negative and becomes significant. In addition, regression (3) passes all the 
diagnostic tests, model specification and structural stability tests and the ECM is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 : Error Correction Representation of the Selected ARDL Growth Model 
Dependent Variable: ΔGrowth Rate of Real GDP 
Regressor (1′) (2′) (3′) (4′) (5′) (6′) 
ΔINTERCEPT 47.821   
(6.466) 
52.110   
(6.448) 
69.378      
(5.332) 
121.131      
(4.229) 
33.472       
(3.803) 
43.115        
(2.526) 
ΔGDP 
GROWTH1 
0.326***     
(3.051) 
0.339***     
(3.196) 
0.288**    
(2.752) 
0.448***    
(3.824) 
0.241**    
(2.354) 
0.251**     
(2.426) 
ΔFIN. LIB 7.172**    
(2.269) 
7.985**    
(2.507) 
18.781*    
(2.050) 
42.402***  
(3.486) 
3.958        
(1.382) 
16.96        
(1.577) 
ΔFIN. LIB1 -7.001**   
(-2.743) 
-6.346**   
(-2.468) 
-12.967***   
(-3.187) 
-33.720***   
(-3.212) 
-6.502**    
(-2.418) 
 
ΔF.DEPTH 0.203     
(1.696) 
0.233*     
(1.934) 
0.221*          
(1.895) 
0.294**         
(2.606) 
0.276**    
(2.160) 
0.294**     
(2.277) 
ΔRIR -0.285***    
(-2.930) 
-0.251**    
(-2.516) 
-0.160            
(-1.432) 
0.031             
(0.270) 
-0.258**   
(-2.730) 
-0.174        
(-1.598) 
ΔINVESTMENT -0.045         
(-0.229) 
-0.075         
(-0.385) 
0.002             
(0.011) 
-0.177           
(-0.830) 
-0.216         
(-1.154) 
-0.161         
(-0.831) 
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ΔINVESTMNT1    -0.595*         
(-1.748) 
-0.563*      
(-1.741) 
-0.546*       
(-1.733) 
ΔINFLATION -7.793***  
(-3.805) 
-6.901***  
(-3.224) 
-8.409***     
(-2.823) 
-12.202***   
(-3.248) 
-8.600***   
(-4.055) 
-7.233***  
(-2.989) 
ΔINFLATION1    7.016*          
(1.766) 
  
ΔGOVEX -2.579***  
(-5.103) 
-2.711***  
(-5.319) 
-3.126***     
(-5.934) 
-3.121***     
(-5.056) 
-2.516***  
(-4.671) 
-2.791***   
(-4.675) 
ΔGOVEX1    0.966*            
(1.981) 
  
ΔOPEN  -0.059         
(-1.273) 
-0.165**        
(-2.586) 
0.027             
(0.260) 
-0.007         
(-0.155) 
-0.035        
(-0.567) 
OPEN1    0.239**        
(2.186) 
  
ΔINSTITUTION     1.388           
(0.945) 
-1.503         
(-0.560) 
ΔFL*INFLATIO
N 
  -3.488            
(-1.279) 
-9.204**       
(-2.811) 
  
ΔFL*INFLATIO
N1 
  1.990**         
(2.323) 
8.755**        
(2.838) 
  
ΔDEBT    -0.113***     
(-3.151) 
  
ΔFL*INSTITUT.      -2.520         
(-1.181) 
ΔFL*INSTITUT.
1 
     -1.032**    
(-2.714) 
ECMt-1 -1.577***    
(-8.905) 
-1.612***    
(-9.108) 
-1.625***      
(-9.477) 
-1.617***    
(-11.651) 
-1.613***   
(-9.731) 
-1.558***  
(-9.374) 
No. of Obs. 
Adjusted-R2 
F-statistic 
38 
0.79 
16.732*** 
38 
0.79 
15.609*** 
38 
0.81 
14.453*** 
38 
0.88 
17.001*** 
38 
0.82 
15.721*** 
38 
0.82 
14.615*** 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
In regression (4) we introduce external debt into our model in order to ascertain the 
robustness of our results. The results are similar, suggesting that our results are robust to 
alternative specifications of the model. In particular, the coefficient on our financial 
liberalisation index is positive and significant both in the long- and short-run. Similarly, other 
variables maintain the same sign except the real interest rate which becomes positive, 
however, with an insignificant impact.  
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Furthermore, in order to test whether better institutional environment is a requirement for 
financial liberalisation to be effective in Nigeria, we first introduce in regression (5) the 
institution variable and then incorporate in regression (6) the financial liberalisation-institution 
interaction term. Recall that civil liberty is used in this study as a proxy for institution. The 
estimated long run relationship is captured in table 5.2. Regression (5) indicates that the 
coefficient on institution is positive and significant; suggesting that institution exerts a positive 
impact on economic growth in Nigeria in the long-run. Moreover, the financial liberalisation 
index has a positive and significant coefficient.  However, in regression (6) the financial 
liberalisation index becomes insignificant when the interaction term is incorporated while the 
interaction term is negative and insignificant which implies, surprisingly, that financial 
liberalisation is not conditioned on better institution. The coefficients of the real interest rate, 
inflation rate and government expenditure are negative and statistically significant while 
financial depth and investment are positive and significant. Trade openness has a negative but 
insignificant coefficient. 
Regressions (5) and (6) are not subject to any econometric problems and they both satisfy the 
diagnostic tests as well as the model specification and structural stability tests. Table 5.3 
presents the ECM representation of the model and it indicates that the ECM is negative and 
significant at the 1% level for both regressions. 
Financial Liberalisation and Investment 
One of the hypotheses of financial liberalisation is that financial liberalisation leads to a more 
efficient allocation of capital and helps in harnessing savings which would in turn increase 
investment. By reducing transaction costs and removing liquidity constraint faced by 
investors, a more liberalised financial system should lead to increased capital accumulation 
which in turn would enhance economic growth. In order to analyse this relation, we estimate 
equation (2) given in the previous chapter: 
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INVESTt = γ0 + γ1FINLIBt + γ2FDEPTHt + γ3LENDINGRATEt + γ4GOVEXPENt  + γ5TDCBt + γ6EXTDEBTt + ϵt 
 
The estimated long run and ECM coefficients are presented in tables 5 and 6 below. Our 
baseline investment model is captured in regression (7) and incorporates the financial 
liberalisation index along with five control variables. The result indicates that the financial 
liberalisation index carries a positive and significant coefficient, which implies that financial 
liberalisation has a positive long-run impact on investment in Nigeria. In particular, a unit 
increase in the financial liberalisation index leads to about 1.4% rise in investment. This result 
supports the financial liberalisation hypothesis of McKinnon and Shaw. In addition, financial 
liberalisation has a positive and significant effect on investment in the short-run as captured 
by the ECM in table 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: Estimated Long-Run Coefficients of the Investment Model  
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENT 
REGRESSOR (7) (8) (9) 
INTERCEPT 15.348                           
(3.938) 
13.081                           
(3.947) 
17.208                           
(6.358) 
FINLIB 1.362***                       
(5.399) 
1.587***                       
(6.675) 
1.433***                       
(7.268) 
FDEPTH 0.356                             
(0.230) 
0.605                             
(0.475) 
1.595                             
(1.582) 
LENDING RATE -0.780***                     
(-3.540) 
-0.335*                          
(-1.786) 
-0.547***                     
(-3.479) 
GOVEXPEN -2.129***                      
(-4.620) 
-2.271***                     
(-6.210) 
-2.438***                     
(-7.112) 
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TDCB 0.239***                       
(2.963) 
0.138**                         
(2.578) 
0.188***                       
(4.197) 
EXTDEBT -4.600***                      
(-4.374) 
-4.664***                      
(-6.570) 
-4.363***                     
(-7.529) 
CIVLIB  0.606**                         
(2.430) 
0.892*                           
(1.943) 
INFLATION   -0.023                 
(-1.434) 
No. of Obs. 
Adjusted-R2 
F-statistic 
Serial Correl. 
Funct. Form 
Normality 
Heteroscedas. 
DW-statistic 
38 
0.88 
34.815*** 
F=2.062 
F=1.394 
LM=1.192 
F=4.071* 
2.350 
38 
0.95 
41.407*** 
F=2.253 
3.125* 
LM=1.639 
F=0.001 
2.447 
38 
0.96 
44.987*** 
F=1.806 
F=0.099 
LM=1.665 
F=0.151 
2.509 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6: Error Correction Representation of the Selected ARDL Investment Model 
Dependent Variable: ΔINVESTMENT 
REGRESSOR (7′) (8′) (9′) 
ΔINTERCEPT 10.157                           
(3.425) 
9.494                              
(3.127) 
14.384                           
(5.097) 
ΔFIN. LIB. 0.901***                       
(3.951) 
0.776***                       
(4.314) 
0.467**                     
(2.595) 
ΔFDEPTH 0.235                             
(0.233) 
0.439                             
(0.479) 
0.945                             
(0.673) 
ΔFDEPTH1   -3.937***                     
(-3.176) 
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ΔLENDING RATE -0.205                            
(-1.217) 
-0.040                            
(-0.291) 
-0.181                             
(-1.435) 
ΔLENDING RATE1   0.189                             
(1.373) 
ΔGOV. EXPEN -1.409***                     
(-3.544) 
-1.248***                        
(-3.704) 
-0.832**                           
(-2.653) 
ΔGOV. EXPEN1  -0.514**                       
(-2.695) 
 
ΔTOT. DEP. OF 
BANKS 
0.158***                      
(3.007) 
0.100**                         
(2.510) 
0.157***                      
(3.820) 
ΔEXT. DEBT -3.044***           
(-4.947) 
-1.635*                          
(-1.999) 
-1.403*                         
(-1.794) 
ΔEXT. DEBT1  2.493***                       
(2.964) 
2.901***                       
(3.763) 
ΔINSTITUTION  -0.082                            
(-0.972) 
-0.405**                     
(-1.963) 
ΔINSTITUTION1  -0.431***                     
(-5.311) 
-0.900***                     
(-4.731) 
ΔINFLATION   0.009                             
(1.171) 
ΔINFLATION1   0.023***                      
(3.050) 
ECMt-1 -0.662***                      
(-5.362) 
-0.726***                     
(-6.406) 
-0.836***                     
(-8.029) 
No. of Obs. 
Adjusted-R2 
F-statistic 
38 
0.50 
6.329*** 
38 
0.77 
12.903*** 
38 
0.84 
15.215*** 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
 
 
Similarly, the financial depth indicator is positive, which implies that financial deepening 
increases investment in Nigeria. However, it has an insignificant coefficient. The coefficient 
on the lending rate is negative and statistically significant, which indicates that the lower the 
lending rates the higher the investment. This result corroborates with the theoretical view that 
higher cost of borrowing discourages investment. Government expenditure has a negative 
and significant coefficient which shows that government expenditure crowds out investment 
and thereby reduces growth. The total deposit of commercial banks has the expected positive 
sign and is statistically significant while external debt carries a negative and statistically 
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significant coefficient. This implies that the burden of external debt contributes negatively to 
investment. 
Furthermore, regression (7) explains about 88% of the variation in investment in Nigeria. The 
regression also satisfies the model specification test and passes all the diagnostic tests but fails 
the heteroscedasticity test at the 10% level. However, this does not affect the reliability of our 
results because it has been found that when variables of different orders are estimated within 
the same regression it is natural to detect heteroscedasticity (Shrestha 2005, pp. 125). In 
addition, the stability test result (see appendix B) shows that the model is stable over time. 
Finally, the ECM has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. The ECM indicates 
that about 66% of the disequilibrium of the previous year’s shock is adjusted back to the long-
run equilibrium in the current year. 
In regression (8) we incorporate institution into our model in order to capture the impact of 
the institutional environment on investment. Our result shows that institution has a positive 
and significant coefficient. This suggests that  better institutional environment  promotes 
economic growth in Nigeria. In addition, the coefficient on the financial liberalisation index 
is positive and significant. Similarly, in regression (9) we introduce inflation into our model to 
the impact of the macroeconomic environment. The result remains robust to alternative 
specifications of our model. The coefficient on inflation is negative, indicating that 
macroeconomic instability discourages investment. However, the impact is insignificant. 
The ECM for both regressions (8) and (9) are correctly signed and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, and shows a return to long-run equilibrium after a shock. In addition, both 
regressions have very high explanatory power and satisfy all the diagnostic tests. Finally the 
models do not suffer from model misspecification and they are stable as shown by the stability 
test (see appendix B). 
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Causality Test on Financial Development and Economic Growth 
Complementing the study is an attempt by the authors to comment on the causal relationship 
between financial development and economic growth. In order to establish this relationship 
in the context of the Nigerian economy, we employ the Granger Causality test introduced by 
Granger (1969). Granger causality addresses the question of whether past values of one 
variable help in forecasting another variable. For example, if past values of Y help to forecast 
X, then it implies that Y Granger causes X. 
In this analysis, we use our variable for financial depth (FDEPTH) to capture the overall level 
of financial development in Nigeria. The basic requirement for the Granger causality test is 
that all variables have to be stationary. Recall that the orchestrated unit root test indicates that 
the proxy of economic growth (GRGDP) and FDEPTH are non-stationary. Thus, we use the 
first difference of our variables in this analysis. The simple model of Granger Causality is 
expressed as follows: 
ΔGRGDPt = ∑ βini=1 ΔGRGDPt−i + ∑ γjnj=1 ΔFDEPTHt−j + ϖ1t                                     (5)    
ΔFDEPTHt = ∑ αini=1 ΔFDEPTHt−i + ∑ ρjnj=1 ΔGRGDPt−j + ϖ2t                                  (6)       
 
In equation (5), the current value of GRGDP is associated with past values of itself and past 
values of FDEPTH. Similarly, equation (6) indicates that the current value of FDEPTH is 
related to past values of itself and past values of GRGDP.  
With this model, inference about granger causality involves tests on coefficients. Thus the null 
hypothesis in (5) is γj = 0, which implies that ΔFDEPTH does not Granger cause ΔGRGDP. 
In equation (6) the null hypothesis is ρj = 0, which means that ΔGRGDP does not Granger 
cause ΔFDEPTH. We employ the Chi-square to determine the rejection rule. Table 7 below 
presents the result of the Granger causality test. 
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TABLE 7 : Granger Causality Test 
Null Hypothesis Chi-square Probability 
ΔFDEPTH does not Granger cause ΔGRGDP 14.526*** 0.006 
ΔGRGDP does not Granger cause ΔFDEPTH 2.293 0.682 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 
As shown in table 7, only the first case displays a statistically significant Chi-square, which 
suggests that we reject the null hypothesis for this case. This shows that financial depth 
Granger causes economic growth. Therefore, we conclude that financial development causes 
economic growth in Nigeria for the period 1970 to 2009. The causality is unidirectional, 
running from financial development to economic growth. The results suggest that the 
financial sector is important in the economic growth of Nigeria. Financial intermediation and 
institutional financial reforms should therefore be enhanced in order to accelerate Nigeria’s 
economic growth. 
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
As a matter of summation, the study has investigated the relationship between economic 
growth, investment and financial liberalization in Nigeria. Generated results indicate that there 
exists a significant long-run relationship between financial liberalisation and economic growth. 
The hypothesis that financial liberalisation has enhanced economic growth in Nigeria is not 
rejected. This result is consistent with the findings of Fowowe (2008) and Okpara (2010). 
Similar results were found by Chaudhry (2010) in the case of Pakistan. Also, results further 
show that financial liberalisation is only effective in a stable macroeconomic environment. 
However, institution has been found not to play a significant role in enhancing the impact of 
financial liberalisation in Nigeria. 
So also, study analysis finds that financial liberalisation leads to increased investment in the 
case of the Nigerian economy. This is consistent with the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis which 
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argues that interest rate deregulation following financial liberalisation increases savings which 
in turn raises investment. This provides further evidence to support the arguments of the 
proponents of financial liberalisation. Thus, investment is a cogent channel through which 
financial liberalisation promote economic growth in Nigeria.  
Still on summary, there exists a causal relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in Nigeria, with financial development Granger causing economic growth. 
This result supports the cointegration analysis of the growth models, which indicate that 
financial depth exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on the growth rate of real 
GDP. This result is also consistent with the findings of Eita and Jordaan (2007) and Akinlo 
and Egbetunde (2010). 
Overall, given the continuous reforms being implemented in Nigeria and the impetus towards 
maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment, it is suspected that the financial sector 
reforms will continue to exert a positive impact on the Nigerian economy. 
 
Conclusively, in order to consolidate the gains of financial liberalisation in Nigeria bearing in 
mind that financial liberalization is not a stand-alone policy in the country, appropriate 
macroeconomic policy, institutional development, and structural reform might be crucial to 
creating the stable economic space for a successful financial liberalisation process. In the same 
vein, there might be the need to stabilise the performance of the financial system in Nigeria 
through appropriate use of fiscal and monetary measures, political stability, better supervision 
and prudential regulations. Furthermore, since financial deepening seems important to 
economic growth in Nigeria, measures should be taken to reduce government inefficiencies 
in order to release resources for the development of financial institutions. 
Since the financial liberalisation process in Nigeria is concurrently run with other programmes 
and not in a vacuum, future studies might also pertinently look at the effects of such 
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programmes thereby creating an isolation effect which might forge further economic 
understanding ‘as the dividends derivable from financial reforms might hinge on the financial 
ambience being ‘’well behaved’’ ‘throughout’ the liberalisation process (Pill and Pradhan 
1997). 
Financial liberalization is indeed the game but not the only game in time as far as successful 
economic development is concerned at least for Nigeria.  
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